威灵顿投资Scott C. Geary：从全球挑战中挖掘投资机遇
Scott C. Geary表示，当下通胀存在着持续存在与结构性趋势的可能，同时世界最大经济体严峻的人口结构问题、不平等的财政计划、去全球化等因素的交互作用，结合大宗商品和劳动力密集型的能源转型，全球正面临着严重的通胀压力。此外，去全球化挑战加剧，各行业面临供应链长期中断的风险，严重的贸易分裂会对全球造成重大的长期不利影响。同时能源转型本身也充斥着各种互相矛盾的动因。对资管公司和整个金融业而言，经济责任的提高可能成为本世纪主动型资产管理最强大的推动力，履行经济责任将导致国家之间板块内部，以及板块之间的差距拉大。与此同时，流动性已经不再足够充裕，未来市场主体间的差距将加速显现，能够快速识别和适应变化、控制成本基础，并保护定价权的企业将脱颖而出。国家之间亦是如此，各国将依靠财政政策，而不仅仅是货币政策来应对面临的挑战。他认为，全球多元化将更为重要。周期性波动加剧可能意味着全球包括美国在投资回报的主导地位将会下降，以及大幅超配某个板块，地区或者国家的整体风险将会上升。此时采用长线主题投资的视角对于在波动中获取回报至关重要。
谢谢大家！我是威灵顿投资管理副主席顾苏君（Scott Geary）。我们公司成立于1928年，现已发展为全球规模最大的独立投资管理公司之一。威灵顿投资管理为客户管理的资产已接近1.1万亿美元[1]，我们很荣幸能够为全球60多个市场，包括养老金、主权财富基金、捐赠基金、基金会、保险公司以及全球财富管理机构在内的2,400多家客户和数百万受益人提供服务。威灵顿投资管理的全球布局始于上世纪80年代初，目前在上海等亚洲主要市场均设有分支机构[2]。
今天我想探讨的主题是经济责任（economic accountability），我们认为它有可能界定未来十年全球各类资产的回报。在展开说明经济责任及其对金融业的影响之前，请让我先和大家介绍一下威灵顿投资的一些情况，以及我们观察了解当今世界的方法。
首先，我们已经构建起了旨在服务于自下而上分析的深度基本面的投资平台；公司没有设立首席投资官的岗位。因此，我们的投资人员不受任何个人或集体自上而下观点的约束。但是，我们通过内部讨论时确实会有主线相同的情况发生，这在去年尤为明显。我们公司的宏观策略师、投资组合经理、全球行业专家以及ESG 分析师都不约而同地认为，新冠疫情催生出一种将由名义利率上升、波动性加大以及经济周期变动更加频繁来塑造的全新投资环境。这种转变之重大怎么说都不为过。不少投资者、策略师和政策制定者的全部职业生涯都处于正增长、反通胀和低利率的单一投资环境中。实际上，自上世纪90年代中期以来，这种经济学模型中的理想状态霸占了近四分之三的时间。
近一年多来，我们的投资平台一直在挑战后全球金融危机环境中建立起来的假设和固定思维。经济责任在与各种资产类别和投资纪律相关的讨论中始终是至关重要的。
那么，我们所说的经济责任是什么？在全球金融危机后的投资环境中，充裕而又廉价的资本减轻了行差踏错的后果。因为一有周期性疲软的迹象，即可通过注入流动性来应对，所以央行因为政策校准不当而被问难的可能性下降。政府受益于这种周期性抑制，因为或政策抑或是财政支出错误或无效而被指责的可能性减小。企业显然也是得益方，由于周期性可预测，又可以通过低成本债务来偿还利息、支付回购以及维持无利润增长低成本负债，企业因为管理失误或商业模式有缺陷而被问责的可能性也降低。
我可以列举出无数的数据来说明过去十年来这种状况在界定市场时的影响力。我相信对在座的各位而言亦是如此。以下是我认为最重要的一些。2009年至2020年期间，美国股债走势一直是负相关，仅因为2013年的“缩减恐慌”中断过一次。回望一百多年的资本市场史，这是前所未有的。与此同时，拿全球金融危机前与2015年至2021年期间进行比较，全球公司债券利差波动率降幅高达80%。而按照某些衡量标准来看，世界各大经济体中利润不足以支付债务利息的上市“僵尸企业”数量已接近20世纪90年代时的五倍。
那么，我们缘何认为这个时代已经结束，而经济责任可能会显著提高的新时代已经开始了呢？新冠疫情无疑带来了暂时性通胀影响，但我们认为它同时也加快了一些将使通胀在可预见的未来持续存在的结构性趋势的发展。例如使得世界最大经济体本已严峻的人口结构问题加剧的死亡和劳动力减少。例如旨在减少遏制不平等的财政计划。再例如使得对全球化即时供应链以及意识形态迥异的国家之间的经济交织的担忧加剧的去全球化。
将这些影响因素与大宗商品和劳动力密集型的能源转型结合起来，我们认为全球正面临着40多年来最严重的通胀压力。身处资本成本不断上升同时叠加全球性挑战日益加剧的环境中，无论是央行、政府还是企业，他们实际上或者被外界认定的处置不当所导致的后果都可能要比之前严重得多。
在过去的一年里，这种可能性已经多次见诸报端，比如加密货币交易所FTX的倒闭，瑞信的贷款损失，当然还有最近的硅谷银行事件。
但在我看来，去年9月英国国债和英镑遭遇的抛售尤其能说明问题。当时英国央行正在加大抑制通胀的力度，距离债券发行计划的启动仅有数日之隔。政府为了使家庭免受能源价格飞涨的影响，则公布了一项积极的财政方案。市场发现了其中的处置失当，即可能会破坏英国经济稳定的相反动机，英国国债随即遭遇的抛售速度暴露出养老基金对利率上升、波动加剧的新投资环境毫无准备，它们还固守在疫情前的站位上。
鉴于未来全球性挑战的性质，可能会出现更多动机相反导致重大经济后果的情况。目前有不少都在酝酿之中。例如，央行在看到劳动力通胀缓和之前并不愿意真正调转政策方向，因此失业率会上升。然而，不论是欧洲还是美国，我们可以看到旨在创造就业机会的财政支出增加，美国的《通胀削减法案》就是其中的中坚力量。就像英国的遭遇一样，政治和政策必将再次发生冲突。
摆在眼前的还有更为复杂的挑战，例如去全球化。许多行业供应链中断的现象日渐频繁，而且持续时间延长。我们认为企业显然有理由重构供应链，政府也有理由鼓励这种转变，而且这个进程明显在提速。美国企业就业岗位回流速度一年快于一年，而按照某些标准衡量，去年更是屡创历史新高。
然而，对回流、近岸或友岸外包的处置不当将需要付出巨大的代价。严重的贸易分裂/割据会对全球产出造成重大的长期不利影响。实施供应链转型的同时，企业和政府在保护生产力和管理成本（无论是资本支出还是劳动力）方面可能会面临复杂的挑战。行差踏错似乎在所难免。
能源转型也是如此，充斥着各种互相矛盾的动因。以铜为例，自2015年以来，全球大型矿商的铜产量相对于全球GDP增速而言一直在下降。然而，能源转型对铜的需求量非常大。未来十年，铜的年需求量有可能会翻一番。
然而，未来三年，新发现的铜矿无一将投入运营。而且，提高铜产量可能需要支付巨额的环境和社会成本。铜矿开采和冶炼会产生大量的碳排放。此外，全球铜产量中有很大一部分来自刚果民主共和国和秘鲁这两个社会关注度日益上升的国家。铜生产能否在不需要支付持平甚或高于收益的环境和社会成本的情况下满足全球需求？这个问题涉及到几乎所有对能源转型至关重要的大宗商品。我们认为许多公司会出现失误，因为急于在新能源经济中巩固市场份额会导致有可能对企业声誉造成重大损害的失误。
那么，对资管公司和整个金融业来说，经济责任的提高意味着什么呢？我们认为，它有可能成为本世纪主动型资产管理最强大的推动力。去年，全球几乎所有股市的分散度和波动性都大幅上升。这种分散度对选股者有利，与2021年相比，主动型资管公司的表现优于其被动型基准的比例上升了约7个百分点，达到了近10年来的最高水平。我相信，这为包括威灵顿投资管理在内的具有长线思维和雄厚研究能力的主动型资管公司创造了绝佳机会。
无论是股票、债券还是私募市场，履行经济责任的提高将导致国家之间、板块内部以及板块之间的差距拉大。正如我们的宏观策略师John Butler常说的那样：“流动性已经不再充裕到足以‘普渡众生’”，在我们看来，赢家和输家都将更为明显，那些能够快速识别和适应变化、控制成本基础并保护定价权的企业将拉开距离。国家之间也是如此。各国将依靠财政政策（而不仅仅是货币政策）来应对所面临的挑战。但这些都将是政治选择，各个国家给出的答案将不尽相同，具体取决于诸多因素，尤其是其在选举周期中所处的阶段。这些国家之间的细微差别将产生重大影响。
威灵顿投资以我们达成的研究深度和跨学科合作而自豪。在经济责任提高的时代，我们认为这会成为更强大的优势。行业专识以及与企业的直接接触，对于判断其管理团队是否准备好应对后果将更为严重的经济环境至关重要。ESG 能力及与学术和气候科学机构的合作（例如威灵顿投资与伍德威尔气候研究中心以及麻省理工学院别具一格的合作伙伴关系），可以通过定量风险评估来帮助我们确认或质疑那些更为定性的观点。宏观策略师可以帮助我们根据不同国家特殊和不稳定的经济因素来分析其中的机会和风险析。而衍生品策略师、交易员和投资科学分析师则可以帮助我们判断市场情绪及技术性仓位何时可能会导致估值背离基本面。
企业管治能力（Stewardship）将变得更加重要。在过去的一年里，越来越多的企业除了采纳我们的建议之外，还会主动来寻求意见。我们认为，全球多元化将更为重要。周期性波动加剧可能意味着美国在投资回报方面的主导地位将会下降，以及大幅超配某个板块、地区或国家的整体风险将会上升。最后，我认为，采用长线主题投资的视角对于在波动中获取回报至关重要。最后，那些为当今世界面临的紧迫问题找出解决方案的公司，很可能会为利益相关方创造最大的长期价值。
在这种环境中，我们预计客户对合作的资管公司会提出更多的要求。这种趋势已经开始——客户希望与数量更少的优秀、稳定、高素质的资管公司合作。如何将整个公司而不只是产品投入到客户关系中，是我们长期以来一直在思考的问题。它不仅包括投资内容和知识共享，还包括全球领先资管公司各职能部门一些最佳实践的培训和共享，如资产配置、风险管理、信息技术、可持续发展和投资科学。在波动加剧、经济责任提高的环境中，公司与客户之间的这种合作对于双方关系的长远发展以及投资组合表现的持续稳定都将变得更加重要。
谢谢各位的专心聆听，并再次感谢今天能有机会来参加此次年会。
Wellington Management Company LLP（WMC）是一家在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）注册的独立投资顾问公司。WMC同时亦在美国商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）注册为商品交易顾问（CTA），为注册商品经理基金运作的商品基金等某些客户担任CTA。WMC依据豁免CTA注册的规定为所有其他客户提供商品交易建议。WMC及其关联公司（统称为”威灵顿投资”）一起为世界各地的机构提供投资管理和投资顾问服务。威灵顿投资总部设在马萨诸塞州波士顿，在下列各地设有分支机构：伊利诺伊州芝加哥、宾夕法尼亚州韦纳、加利福尼亚州旧金山、法兰克福、香港、伦敦、卢森堡、马德里、米兰、上海、新加坡、悉尼、东京、多伦多及苏黎世。
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The topic I’d like to discuss today is economic accountability, a theme we believe could define global returns across asset classes for the next decade. But before I dive into what I mean by economic accountability and the implications for the financial industry, a little background about our firm and how we see the world today.
Our investment platform has been constructed to support bottom-up deep fundamental analysis. We have no CIO. Our investors are not guided by one individual or even a collective top-down perspective. That said, common throughlines do emerge from our internal debate and we’ve seen that over the past year. Whether our macro strategists, our portfolio managers, our global industry experts or our ESG analysts, consensus is as evident as it ever is at our firm: COVID has ushered in a new investment regime, one that will be shaped by higher nominal rates, greater volatility, and more frequent movement between economic cycles.It is hard to overstate how significant a shift this is. Most investors, strategists and policymakers have spent their entire careers in the single regime of positive growth alongside disinflation and low interest rates. In fact, this ‘goldilocks’ environment has persisted roughly three quarters of the time since the mid-1990s.
For more than a year now, our investment platform has made a concerted effort to challenge the assumptions and biases built up over the post-GFC regime. Across asset classes and investment disciplines, economic accountability has been paramount in those discussions.
So, what do we mean by economic accountability? Abundant, cheap capital during the post-GFC regime limited consequences for missteps. Central banks were less accountable for policy miscalibration because any sign of cyclical weakness could be met with liquidity injections. Governments benefited from that cyclical suppression, and were less accountable for misguided or ineffectual policy or fiscal spending. And companies obviously benefitted as well, less accountable for management missteps or flawed business models due to cyclical predictability and cheap debt that could meet interest obligations, pay for buybacks, and sustain unprofitable growth.
Obviously, I could cite countless stats to illustrate how definitional this has been for markets over the past decade. I’m sure so could most of you. That said, here are just a few that remain top of mind for me: From 2009 to 2020, the US stock/bond correlation had a run in negative territory that was interrupted only once—by 2013’s taper tantrum. Looking back more than a century, that’s unprecedented in market history. Meanwhile, global corporate bond spread volatility plummeted as much as 80% comparing pre-GFC to the 2015 to 2021 period. And by some measures, the number of publicly listed zombie companies in the world’s largest economies—-—companies not generating enough profit to cover interest on debt—has roughly quintuples since the 1990s.
So, why do we believe this era has ended and we’ve begun a new one in which economic accountability could rise significantly? While COVID undoubtedly triggered transitory inflation forces, we also believe it accelerated structural trends that will make inflation persistent for the foreseeable future. This includes the deaths and workforce exits that exacerbated already challenging demographics in the world’s biggest economies. It includes the fiscal programs aimed at curbing inequality. And it includes deglobalization--intensifying concern about globalized, just-in-time supply chains and the economic intertwinement of ideologically disparate nations.
You couple those forces with the energy transition, which is commodity and labor intensive, and we believe the globe is facing more powerful inflationary forces than seen in more than 40 years. And when you have a rising cost of capital at the same time global challenges are intensifying, we are likely to see far greater consequences for real or perceived mismanagement, whether by central banks, governments, or companies.
We’ve gotten many headline-grabbing glimpses of this potential over the past year. The implosion of FTX. Credit Suisse’s loan losses. And, of course, the recent implosion of Silicon Valley Bank.
But, to my mind, the September UK rate and currency sell-off was particularly illustrative. The Bank of England was escalating efforts to suppress inflation, only days away from starting its bond selling program. The government was trying to insulate households against skyrocketing energy prices, announcing an aggressive fiscal package. The market saw mismanagement—oppositional motivations that could destabilize the UK economy—and sold off UK government debt at a rate that exposed how unprepared pension funds were for a new investment regime of higher and more volatile rates, still anchored to their pre-COVID positioning.
Given the nature of the global challenges ahead, far more examples of oppositional motivations causing significant financial consequences are likely to emerge. Many are brewing today. For one, central banks will be reluctant to truly pivot until they see labor inflation moderate, therefore, unemployment rise. Yet, from Europe to the US, we’ve seen an escalation of fiscal spending aimed at job creation, headlined by the US’ Inflation Reduction Act. It’s a recipe for politics and policy to once again come to loggerheads as seen in the UK.
Even more complicated challenges lay on the horizon. Consider deglobalization. Supply chain disruptions have grown in both frequency and duration across many industries. We believe there is clear reason for companies to reimagine supply chains and for governments to incentivize that transformation. And progress is clearly accelerating. Reshoring by US companies has been accelerating year-over-year, hitting record levels last year by some measures.
Yet, mismanagement of reshoring, nearshoring, or friendshoring efforts will come with a significant cost. Severe trade fragmentation could have a significant long term detrimental impact on global output. Companies and governments may face a complex challenge in protecting productivity and managing costs—whether CAPEX or labor—while executing supply chain transformation. Missteps appear inevitable.
The same can be said about the energy transition, which is ripe with conflicting motivations. Just consider copper. Production of copper by large-cap global miners has been in perpetual decline relative to global GDP growth since 2015. Yet, the energy transition is incredibly copper intensive. A nnual demand for copper could be as much as double over the next decade.
Yet, no new copper discoveries are set to be operational in the next three years. And the environment and social cost of ramping up copper production is likely to prove significant. Copper mining and smelting emits significant amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Meanwhile, a large proportion of global copper production comes from two nations in which social concerns are rising, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Peru. Can copper production meet global demand without environmental and social costs that equal or even outweigh the benefits? This question is relevant across nearly all commodities central to the energy transition. And we believe many companies will misstep as urgency to solidify market share in the new energy economy leads to missteps that could do significant reputational damage.
So, what are the implications of rising economic accountability for allocators and the financial industry more generally? We believe it could prove the most powerful tailwind for active management this century. Last year, dispersion and volatility spiked in almost every global equity market. This dispersion was advantageous for stock pickers, with the percentage of active managers outperforming their passive benchmarks up roughly seven percentage points versus 2021, reaching the highest rate in roughly a decade. I believe this creates a great opportunity for long-term thinking active managers with deep research capabilities, such as Wellington Management.
Whether equities, credit, or private markets, greater economic accountability will lead to greater dispersion between nations and within and between sectors. As our Macro Strategist John Butler likes to say: “Liquidity will no longer float all boats.” In our view, there will be more explicit winners and losers—greater differentiation between those firms that can quickly identify and adapt to change, control their cost bases, and protect pricing power. The same could prove true between nations. Different countries will lean on fiscal policy, rather than just monetary, to answer the challenges they face. But these become political choices and different countries will answer those questions differently, depending on many factors, not least of which is what stage a country is in in its electoral cycle. These country nuances will matter a lot.
Our firm prides itself on the depth of our research and cross-discipline collaboration. In an era of greater economic accountability, we believe that will be an even more powerful edge. Sector expertise and direct engagement with companies will be essential to diagnosing the preparedness of management teams to navigate a more consequential economic environment. ESG capabilities and collaborations with academic and climate science institutions, such as Wellington Management’s unique partnerships with Woodwell and MIT, can help confirm or challenge those more qualitative judgements with quantitative risk assessments. Macro strategists can help contextualize those opportunities and risks based on idiosyncratic and volatile nation-by-nation economic factors. And our derivatives strategists, traders, and investment science analysts can help diagnose when market sentiment and technical positioning might cause valuations to diverge from fundamentals.
Stewardship of companies will be more essential. Over the past year, we’ve already seen an increasing number of companies seeking out our advice rather than just accepting it when offered. We believe global diversification will matter more. Greater cyclical volatility could mean less consistent US dominance over returns and more overall risk in significantly overweighting a sector, region, or nation. Finally, I believe a long-term, thematic lens will be essential to driving returns through volatility. In the end, the firms that author solutions to today’s urgent problems are likely to generate the most long-term value for stakeholders.
We also expect clients to demand more from their asset manager partners in this environment. It’s progression that was already well underway—they’ve wanted to work with a smaller number of good, consistent, high-quality managers. We’ve long thought about bringing our “whole firm” into a client relationship, not just products. This includes investment content and knowledge sharing, but also training and the sharing of some of the best practices across all functions of a leading global asset manager such as asset allocation, risk management, IT, sustainability, and investment science. In an environment of greater volatility and economic accountability, that collaboration between firm and client will become even more essential to the durability of both relationships and portfolio performance.
Thank you for your kind attention and again thank you for the opportunity to participate today.
Source:
[1] & [2] All figures are for Wellington Management Group of companies as of 31 December 2022.
